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N ow, both the employee and the company will be held criminally liable, unless the company 
can show it  had put in place 
reasonable procedures to prevent 
the employee from facilitating tax 
evasion, or it was unreasonable to 
expect the company to have these 
procedures in place.
New corporate offences
Initially directed at tax advisers 
working in banks and accountancy 
practices who devised complex tax 
schemes which drifted across the 
line between lawful tax avoidance 
and criminal tax evasion, the 
offences apply to all companies and 
partnerships wherever incorporated 
or formed. As the Government 
explained in its explanatory notes, 
the new offences give effect to 
David Cameron’s commitment to 
legislate following publication of the 
Panama Papers.
 
There are two offences set out in 
sections 45 and 46 of the Criminal 
Finances Act 2017.  The f i rst 
focuses on facilitating evasion 
of UK taxes. The second offence 
applies where a company facilitates 
the evasion of foreign tax.
In some respects, the corporate 
facilitation offences are no more 
than a logical extension to the 
ground-breaking corporate offence 
established in section 7 of the 
Br ibery Act 2010. Under this 
provision, a company or partnership 
is held criminally responsible where 
it has failed to put in place adequate 
procedures to prevent the payment 
of a bribe made or received by 
a person associated with the 
company or partnership. The 
company is liable to be punished 
by the imposition of an unlimited 
fine, and there is potential exposure 
to criminal liability for the directors 
under section 10 of the Aiders and 
Abetters Act 1861 as aiders and 
abetters to the company’s default.
But the corporate facil itation 
offences apply more widely. 
Under these new offences, there 
is no need for a prosecutor to 
establ ish that  a  company or 
partnership benefited from the 
facilitation of tax evasion which has 
taken place. The revenue authority 
is the loser, with the direct gain 
made by the company’s customer 
or supplier and not by the company 
or partnership itself. The position is 
different in a bribery case where an 
associated person bribes another 
person intending to obtain or 
retain business for the company or 
partnership, or to obtain or retain 
an advantage in the conduct of 
its business. Here, the gain for the 
company or partnership is obvious.
The underlying misconduct is more 
remote in the corporate facilitation 
offences than in the bribery offence. 
If a company is to be convicted 
of failing to put in place adequate 
procedures to prevent bribery, 
the prosecution must prove the 
existence of the bribe which will 
have been paid or received by 
the person associated with the 
company or partnership. Whereas 
in  the case of  the corporate 
facilitation offences, the underlying 
tax evasion is committed not by 
the associated person who is the 
facilitator but by the person whom 
he or she facilitates.
Increasing corporate 
responsibility
This extension of corporate criminal 
liability into the boardroom has 
passed into law largely unnoticed. 
Practitioners have warned about 
the increasing burden of new 
compliance obligations resting on 
companies and partnerships to 
put in place reasonable prevention 
systems to prevent the facilitation 
of another person’s tax evasion. 
However,  the widening of the 
principle to capture secondary 
parties where there is no direct 
c o r p o r a t e  b e n e f i t  h a s  g o n e 
unchallenged.
The imposi t ion of  corporate 
criminal l iabil ity for failure to 
prevent offences reflects a growing 
desire to persuade companies 
a n d  p a r t n e r s h i p s  o f  t h e i r 
societal responsibility to curtail 
corruption and tax evasion. In the 
current climate, companies and 
partnerships are expected to police 
themselves as part of a corporate 
enforcement strategy. 
This trend wi l l  continue,  and 
the UK government has already 
consulted on the extension of 
the corporate bribery offence to 
cover all economic crimes. The 
approach is international and 
Overtaxing Criminal Law
The criminal law took a giant leap into the dark when the 
corporate facilitation of tax evasion offences came into force 
on 30 September 2017. Previously, where a company employee 
assisted a customer or supplier to evade tax, the employee 
would be criminally liable but the company would not. 
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harks back to a Council of Europe 
Recommendation in 1988 which 
regarded the development of 
the criminal law as a convenient 
tool for fostering good corporate 
c u l t u r e  a n d  g o v e r n a n c e 
processes. As paragraph 4 of the 
Recommendation provided, a 
company should be exonerated 
from criminal liability only where 
its management is not implicated 
in the offence and has taken 
all necessary steps to prevent 
its commission. The key point 
for companies and directors to 
appreciate is that the criminal 
law is not holding a company or 
partnership liable for the failings of 
its employee or servant or agent, 
but for the commission of its own 
offence defined in the statutory 
sub-heading as a failure to institute 
adequate procedures to prevent 
the occurrence of an act of bribery 
or facilitation of tax evasion in 
question. 
There is  nothing wrong with 
criminal law playing a proactive role 
to achieve a socially useful aim. The 
days have long gone when directors 
could say that their singular role 
in life was to maximise company 
profits, without consideration of the 
wider implications of their actions. 
For some years, the civil law has 
required a director to have regard 
not only to the likely consequences 
of any decision in the long term 
and the interests of the company's 
employees, but also the impact of 
the company's operations on the 
community and the environment, 
and the desirability of the company 
maintaining a reputation for high 
standards of business conduct. 
These obligations are set out in 
section 172 of the Companies Act 
2006 and apply to all company 
directors, irrespective of whether 
the  company  is  a  pr ivate  or 
publ ic  l imited company.  The 
criminal law obligation to take 
adequate measures to prevent the 
commission of bribery or facilitating 
a tax evasion offence is completely 
aligned with the wider obligations of 
a director in civil law under section 
172 of the Companies Act 2006.
But for those who regard the 
introduction of the bribery offence 
as the thin end of the wedge, the 
width of the wedge has just got 
thinner. 
Foreign taxes
It is unprecedented for Parliament 
to have created a financial crime 
offence directed at the prevention 
of  loss  to  a  fore ign  revenue 
a u t h o r i t y.  E n t i re l y  d i f fe re n t 
considerations of public policy 
apply where the corporate offence 
is directed at the prevention of tax 
loss to the UK revenue in contrast 
to the prevention of loss to a foreign 
revenue authority. Historically, it has 
always been a widely recognised 
principle of private international 
law that one State will not assist 
another State in the enforcement of 
its revenue claims. This is because 
the enforcement of a claim for tax 
is an exercise of sovereign power 
by the State which imposed the tax, 
and so enforcement of the foreign 
tax constitutes an assertion of 
sovereign authority by one State 
within the territory of another. This 
principle has been recognised in 
England as well as courts in several 
other common law jurisdictions 
such as United States, Canada, 
Ireland, South Africa, and Australia. 
Accordingly, even where a foreign 
State respects the Rule of Law, the 
new corporate offence involving 
facilitation of foreign tax evasion 
takes international co-operation to 
a new level. 
Under this new law, cases may 
arise where, for example, the UK 
authorities wish to prosecute 
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a company or partnership for 
facilitating a French or German 
football player with a Premier 
League club to evade tax in his 
home country.  However,  the 
potential application of the offence 
is not so confined. Suppose the 
football  player comes from a 
country against whom the UK has 
economic sanctions in place. Is it 
seriously contemplated that the 
UK will assist a rogue State in the 
collection of its revenue? 
It is true that criminal proceedings 
can be brought in a case involving 
l o s s  t o  a  f o r e i g n  r e v e n u e 
authority only where the Director 
of Public Prosecutions or the 
Director of the Serious Fraud 
Office grants his consent, but 
there is nothing in the wording 
of the offence which restricts its 
geographical application. Reliance 
on the exercise of prosecutorial 
discret ion is  not a suff ic ient 
safeguard where the scope of 
a criminal offence breaks new 
ground in the sphere of corporate 
criminal liability and is configured 
so widely. This is a step too far  on 
the part of our legislators, and it 
needs to be called out.
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